This blog post concerns revisions of two different parts of my rough cut, and how they changed for the final video.
Concerning the five reasons, I have concluded that there is not enough detail for each point in order to convince the reader. Here is an attempt to bolster each argument in the body.
Rough Body:
Here are FIVE reasons that allowing an FBI backdoor on every iPhone is a terrible idea.
REASON 1: There is no single use key like the FBI wants. Access to one iPhone means access to every iPhone. As reasonable as it seems to make a one-use, the algorithms in which the iPhone encrypts data is standard across every phone. Once you have access to one, you have access to them all.
REASON 2: It would hardly provide emotional support to grieving family members. The cynical approach to this is that their loved ones are already gone; it is selfish to jeopardize the lives of millions of law-abiding Americans in the name of "closure".
REASON 3: If FBI backdoor reaches their hands into Apple's phones, then it is a powerful statement to Google, Microsoft, and other leading tech companies that they are next. No one is safe because then the government has consent to go digging wherever they want.
REASON 4: Cyberterrorism is a much more prevalent threat than the random act of domestic violence. There is no concrete evidence that this was a foreign-inspired terror attack. In short, other countries that we are not on good terms with (North Korea, for example) would abuse these security shortcomings, thus threatening each individual who uses an iPhone in the United States, IN ADDITION TO 30 people in California.
Reason 5: Identifying these 18 minutes that went undocumented would not compensate for the fact that the suspects evaded the scene. There were other ways that the issue could have been resolved that don't involve such a drastic proposition, perhaps swifter police response times? When seconds mattered, the police show up way too late, which points that maybe staffing the police department with a few workers would be a more viable solution.
Revised Body:
Here are FIVE reasons that allowing an FBI backdoor on every iPhone is a terrible idea.
REASON 1: There is no single use key like the FBI wants. Access to one iPhone means access to every iPhone. As reasonable as it seems to make a one-use, the algorithms in which the iPhone encrypts data is standard across every phone. Once you have access to one, you have access to them all.
REASON 2: It would hardly provide emotional support to grieving family members. The cynical approach to this is that their loved ones are already gone; it is selfish to jeopardize the lives of millions of law-abiding Americans in the name of "closure".
REASON 3: If FBI backdoor reaches their hands into Apple's phones, then it is a powerful statement to Google, Microsoft, and other leading tech companies that they are next. No one is safe because then the government has consent to go digging wherever they want.
REASON 4: Cyberterrorism is a much more prevalent threat than the random act of domestic violence. There is no concrete evidence that this was a foreign-inspired terror attack. In short, other countries that we are not on good terms with (North Korea, for example) would abuse these security shortcomings, thus threatening each individual who uses an iPhone in the United States, IN ADDITION TO 30 people in California.
Reason 5: Identifying these 18 minutes that went undocumented would not compensate for the fact that the suspects evaded the scene. There were other ways that the issue could have been resolved that don't involve such a drastic proposition, perhaps swifter police response times? When seconds mattered, the police show up way too late, which points that maybe staffing the police department with a few workers would be a more viable solution.
It doesn't take a genius to notice that my rough conclusion is half-assed. So here is an attempt to expand upon the points I barely touched. Not only do I seek more content, but I seek a more targeted conclusion to make, that point being that the backdoor's cons outweigh the pros.
Rough Conclusion:
Even in theory, the thought that we should allow government officials to view private terrorist conversations automatically means that they would see our conversations too. It's a terrible idea, and put into practice, when would we be able to say "enough is enough, you can't see anymore"? This isn't about finding where terrorists ran around in California for 18 minutes, it's about protecting the liberties of the law-abiding citizen, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Revised Conclusion:
The aforementioned points provide more than ample evidence that exposing key weaknesses of the iPhone (that should not and were not intended in the first place) has backlashes that extend far beyond what the FBI suggests. It's a terrible idea, and put into practice, strips us of one of our amendments that binds our country together - our right to privacy.? This isn't about finding where terrorists ran around in California for 18 minutes, it's about protecting the liberties of the law-abiding citizen, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. It's about telling the FBI that they cannot bully Apple, they cannot bully Google, they cannot bully ANYONE into playing their sick game.
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